It is shown that the paradoxes of confirmation are closely linked to the paradoxes of material implication and that they can be avoided by formulating natural laws in terms of a genuine if-Connective rather than the material conditional. However, Natural laws so expressed are not confirmed by simple conjunctions. The question then is whether the common assumption that simple conjunctions do confirm universal generalizations is correct. The answer given is that it is not. In particular, A confirming proposition of the (...) form 'this is a black raven' is not equivalent to 'this is a raven and this is black'. (shrink)

I want to pull together some well-known facts which, when taken together, provide us with a plausible, and I think persuasive, argument that Aristotle's logic is inconsistent. We cannot, of course, hope to show that it is formally inconsistent since he does not present us with a fully worked-out formal system. On the other hand, we do have Lukasiewicz's formal version of Aristotelian logic which he proves consistent. (edited).